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Comment
Capacity of Minors to be
Chargeable with Negligence
And Their Standard of Care
The infant is favored by the law not so much on his lack of knowledge
as because of indiscretion, imprudence, lack of judgment, and impul-
siveness.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Nebraska law, like that of other American jurisdictions, be-
stows considerable favoritism upon children. Although a minor,
like an adult, may sue2 or be sued,3 the minor is the subject of
legal favoritism predicated on the disability of infancy which
has long been recognized at common law.4 This favoritism is
obvious in the special treatment accorded youthful criminal
offenders; 5 in contract law, under which the contracts of minors
are in some cases voidable; 6 in the law of intentional tort;7 and in
the law of negligent tort.8
It is the last of these examples of favoritism-the special
consideration given minors in the law of negligence-which is
the topic of this comment. This special consideration has taken
the form of an ushering out from any jury room, when a child's
negligence is considered, of the venerable "reasonable man"
1. Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431,438,37 N.W.2d 607,
611 (1949).
2. Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-307
(Reissue 1975). Actually, minors are favored even in the statutes pertaining
to the right to sue. Statutes of limitation generally do not run against a
minor until the disability of infancy is removed. Id. § 25-213.
3. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-309 (Reissue 1975).
4. Kleffel v. Bullock, 8 Neb. 336, 1 N.W. 250 (1879).
5. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. 99 43-201, 205 (Reissue 1974) (allowing a county
attorney to deal with an offender under 18 years of age in juvenile court);
id. § 43-212.01 to .03 (providing special protections for a minor fingerprinted
in the investigation of an unlawful act).
6. Philpot v. Sandwich Mfg. Co., 18 Neb. 54, 24 N.W. 428 (1885).
7. Connors v. Pantano, 165 Neb. 515, 86 N.W.2d 367 (1957) (child, four years
and seven months of age, held incapable of intentional tort).
8. Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607
(1949) (whether a minor is capable of negligence is a fact question for jury;
adult standard of care not applied to child).
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against whom the acts of adult parties are objectively meas-
ured.9 Instead, minors' acts and omissions are scrutinized by a
subjective standard, which may be stated as a pair of fact is-
sues-capacity and standard of care-which in Nebraska have
been formulated thus: "Whether or not negligence may be at-
tributed to a minor of the age of the plaintiff [or defendant] is
usually a matter for a jury under the circumstances of each
case"10 and "[t]he plaintiff [or defendant] is required to exercise
that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent child of the
same capacity to appreciate and avoid danger would use in the
same situation."" By operation of these factual inquiries, a
child's capacity to be chargeable with negligence, as well as the
child's standard of care, is, unlike that of an adult, subjective
and somewhat nebulous.
Springing from these general statements are several issues:
what are the exceptions to the general rule; are there conflicts
with other tort doctrines; and are there inconsistencies or gaps
in the case law? While cases from other jurisdictions will be
cited in discussing these issues, there will be no attempt to detail
the law of any state except that of Nebraska. With regard to
Nebraska law on minors and negligence, this comment will ven-
ture into its historical development, the current status of the
law, problem areas, and comments on the problem areas.
II. MINORS AND NEGLIGENCE
The common law grants no tort immunity on account of the
minority status of children; they may be liable to others for their
negligence 12 and may be prevented from recovery by their con-
tributory negligence. 13 It is in fact contributory negligence of
minors which is considered in the majority of the cases, but
there appears to be no different treatment of a minor defend-
ant's primary negligence than of a minor plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence.1
4
9. Kearney Elec. Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390, 404, 63 N.W. 941, 946 (1895);
Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1738).
10. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957).
11. Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299, 301-02, 226 N.W.2d 632, 634 (1975).
12. Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960).
13. Once capacity for the negligence which contributes to the child's injury is
established, the process of measuring a child's acts by the subjective stan-
dard of care is the same as the process of measuring an adult's acts by the
reasonable man standard. See, e.g., Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299,
226 N.W.2d 632 (1975).
14. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser noted in passing that it was
urged, some 30 years ago, that there should be a distinction between a child
plaintiff and a child defendant. The argument was that an adult standard
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Notwithstanding the absence of explicit immunity, the posi-
tion of a minor who is claimed to be negligent is very unlike that
of an adult in a similar predicament. Whether a minor is to be
deemed negligent in a particular case requires an inquiry quite
different from that applied to an adult. As the subsequent dis-
cussion indicates, the precise nature of the inquiry for children
varies among the jurisdictions.
A. Minors' Capacity to be Chargeable with Negligence
A type of pseudo-immunity for children accused of negli-
gence has been developed by the American courts in the form of
judicial declarations that some minors, notably the very young
ones, have no "capacity" for negligence; that is, they are legally
incapable of negligent acts and omissions. This judicial accom-
modation to the human experience that "kids will be kids"
cannot be said to be predicated on the physical characteristics
of childhood because in negligence law generally, including
cases involving adults, physical disabilities have already been
taken into account in formulating the reasonable man against
whom the parties are measured.15 Rather, the accommodation is
in the area of mental deficiency, and represents a substantial
departure from the law of negligence as applied to adults. For
adults, mental deficiency, short of idiocy, is not a factor con-
sidered in the reasonable man formulation.16 For children, how-
ever, varying mental capabilities are considered and some
minors are eligible for characterization as devoid of any capac-
ity for negligence.
17
There appears to be no single statement of law which, cap-
tures the essence of childrens' capacity for negligence. In fact,
of care should be applied to a minor defendant because "in practice chil-
dren do not pay judgments against them for injuries inflicted, and such
payment comes, if at all, from an adult, or from insurance paid for by an
adult." Id. The cases, Prosser added, do not support the argument, which
was made initially in James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact
of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 554-56 (1948). While this comment
does not present precisely the same view, it is noted that child defendant
cases (as opposed to child plaintiff cases) pre3ent the stronger argument
for a compensation, rather than a fault, focus in minor negligence law. See
§ IV of text infra.
15. Otterbeck v. Lamb, 85 Nev. 456, 456 P.2d 855 (1969) (deaf person need not
exercise greater care than unimpaired person); Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa.
468, 265 A.2d 783 (1970) (blind person not bound to discover everything a
sighted person would discover, but only to use due care under the circum-
stances).
16. Worthington & Co. v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892) ("dull" person
chargeable with same degree of care as one who is "brighter").
17. Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 241 N.W. 535 (1932).
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in many of the cases there is no specific statement on capacity at
all; the issue is commonly submerged into the standard of care
against which a minor's acts are to be gauged in determining the
ultimate issue of negligence. Typical of the combined inquiry
into capacity and standard of care is this language:
No arbitrary rule can be established fixing the age at which a child
• . .may be declared wholly capable or incapable of understanding
and avoiding the dangers to be encountered upon railway tracks. It is
a question of capacity in each case .... [T]he rule is believed to be
recognized in all the courts of the country that a child is not negligent
if he exercises the degree of care which, under like circumstances,
would reasonably be expected of one of his years and capacity. 18
The aspect of capacity, as distinguished from the application of
the standard of care, typically surfaces and is treated in its own
right only when a court considers a claim of negligence against
a very young child.19 Where, in such a case, the capacity for
negligence is found to exist as a first step of analysis, the next
steps are to determine the standard of care by which to judge
the minor's acts and to decide whether the minor met that stan-
dard.20
Jurisdictions vary in their approaches for determining ca-
pacity of minors for negligence. One approach has been to es-
tablish gross age groupings and attach certain presumptions to
members of these groups. For example, it has been held that a
child under seven years of age is conclusively presumed incap-
able of negligence,21 that a child from seven to about fourteen
years of age is rebuttably presumed incapable of negligence, 22
and that a minor in the teenage years is presumed capable of
negligence.23 Somewhat similar to this triad of presumptions is
a doctrine in which a certain minimum age for capacity to be
negligent is fixed. This doctrine, applied by a majority of the
courts, is actually an exception to the general rule of infant
liability for torts and is available only to children of "tender
years. ' 24 Just how "tender" a child must be to qualify for the
status of incapacity to be negligent has varied in the courts'
18. Dodwell v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 384 S.W.2d 643, 647-48 (Mo. 1964).
19. See notes 24-26 infra.
20. Bush v. New Jersey & New York Transit Co., 30 N.J. 345, 153 A.2d 28 (1959).
The standard of care is discussed in § II-B of text infra.
21. Ward v. Music, 257 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1953); Baker v. Alt, 374 Mich. 492, 132
N.W.2d 614 (1965).
22. Adams v. State Bd. of Educ., 248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E.2d 854 (1958).
23. Sheetz v. Welch, 89 Ga. App. 749, 81 S.E.2d 319 (1954) (16-year-old rebut-
tably presumed capable of negligence); Gayhart v. Schwabe, 80 Idaho 354,
330 P.2d 327 (1958) (13-year-old apparently conclusively presumed capable
of negligence although subjective standard of care applied).
24. Connor v. Houtman, 350 P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. 1960).
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case-by-case applications of the doctrine; generally the "tender
years" are those below the age of seven.25 Once a child is beyond
the "tender years," the inquiry into capacity tends to blend into
determining the minor's standard of care.26 In short, no arbi-
trary rule of presumption applies once the "tender years" are
passed.
Judicial movement away from arbitrary rules 27 on capacity
of minors to be negligent has been manifested in holdings that
capacity, like standard of care, is an issue of fact, not law:
The capacity or incapacity of a child is a factual inquiry and the test to
be applied is that applicable to any other question of fact. If the trial
judge, after a consideration of the age, experience and capacity of the
child to understand and avoid the risks and dangers to which it was
exposed in the actual circumstances and situation of the case, deter-
mines that fair-minded men might honestly differ as to whether the
child failed to exercise that degree of care that is usually exercised by
persons of similar age, experience and intelligence, the question of the
child's contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury .... 28
It is clear, however, that while such an inquiry into capacity is
satisfactory for children of most ages, the influence of the cases
which created the triad of presumptions is not completely un-
felt, at least in regard to very young and very old children. So,
where fair-minded men could not differ, capacity may yet be
determined by the court, not as a conclusive or rebuttable pre-
sumption, but apparently as a matter of law where the minor is
"so young and immature as to require the court to judicially
know that it could not contribute to its own injury or be respon-
sible for its acts, or so old and mature that the court must know
that, though an infant, yet it is responsible.
29
B. Minor's Standard of Care
Assuming, as the preceding discussion suggests, that capac-
ity for negligence is a viable and separate issue from the stan-
dard of care owed by minors, logic urges a three-step analytical
framework for determining whether a particular minor was
negligent: (1) is a minor of this particular child's age, intelli-
gence and experience capable of negligence; (2) if so, what is the
appropriate standard of care; and (3) did this particular child
meet-this standard?30 But, few courts have bothered with this
25. Id. (under age five); Thomas v. Tesch, 268 Wis. 338, 67 N.W. 2d 367 (1954),
rehearing denied, 268 Wis. 341a, 68 N.W.2d 457 (1955) (almost five-and-a-
half).
26. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 32.
28. Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 346, 366 P.2d 603, 606 (1961).
29. Id.
30. See note 20 supra.
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approach. For example, in Mann v. Fairbourn3' the Utah Su-
preme Court merged the first and third steps into a single ques-
tion of fact.32 Such an approach, if not perfectly logical, is cer-
tainly understandable; when arbitrary rules are no longer used
to determine capacity, the subjective inquiry into capacity is
practically subsumed in the application of the subjective stan-
dard of care. Both the inquiry and the application focus on what
society expects in the behavior of youngsters of a certain age,
mentality and experience.
However, complete merger of the inquiry into capacity and
the application of the standard of care is to invite reversible
error, according to at least one court. In Grant v. Mays,33 in
contrast to Mann in which the Utah court's language subsumed
the capacity inquiry into the application of the standard of care,
a Virginia trial court used the standard of care to determine
capacity. The trial judge granted a plaintiff's jury instruction
which read in part:
[I]f the infant plaintiff exercised such care and caution as might rea-
sonably have been expected from a child of his age, discretion and
intelligence under the circumstances of this case, and he was injured
in consequence of the negligence of the defendant, then the defendant
is liable, although the infant plaintiff may have contributed to the
injury.34
In finding this instruction reversible error, the Virginia Su-
preme Court explained:
This [emphasized] language erroneously took away from the jury the
question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff and in effect told
them that he was not capable of being contributorily negligent as a
matter of law, which is the rule applicable to a child under 7 years of
age. [The plaintiff was 14.] The instruction was also in conflict with
other instructions. . . and confused the issues of capacity and stan-
dard of care.35
Short of such misapplication of the standard of care, it is
obvious that the central determinant of capacity and the ulti-
mate issue of a minor's negligence is the widely-recognized sub-
jective standard of care. While the language varies among juris-
dictions, the thrust of the standard is reflected in this formula-
tion: "By the weight of authority, the standard by which [a
child's] conduct is to be measured is that degree of care, which
children of the same age, experience, discretion and knowledge
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 3 6
31. 12 Utah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 603 (1961).
32. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
33. 204 Va. 41, 129 S.E.2d 10 (1963).
34. Id. at 43, 129 S.E.2d at 12 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 45, 129 S.E.2d at 13 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 45, 129 S.E.2d at 13. Note the similar formulations in the text accom-
panying notes 11 and 18 supra. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
464(2) (1965) (child "of like age, intelligence, and experience").
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Other statements of the standard strike the same theme: "A
child is held to that standard of care which could be expected
from an ordinary child of the same age, experience, knowledge,
and discretion, '37 and "that [care] which is usually exercised by
persons of the same age, experience and intelligence under like
or similar circumstances. '3 8
Normally, whether a minor has met this subjective standard
of care,39 like his capacity for negligence and the standard it-
self,40 is for the jury to decide. Normally, but not always. On
occasion, the subjective test's application has been wrested
from the jury and vested in the judge. Findings of contributory
negligence of minors as matters of law typically have occurred
in older cases in which the child's acts were extremely care-
less. 41 But, as the general child's standard of care indicates, this
approach has been severely limited.42
C. Adult Activities
The tort doctrine under which "negligent" minors have
avoided the adult, reasonable man standard of care is not, of
course, absolute. Well into the development of the child's special
status in negligence law, courts were confronted with demands
which conflicted with human sympathy for children and chil-
dren's inherent failings of prudence.
Some courts have perceived one such conflict in cases in
which minors were engaged in adult activities-for example,
driving automobiles. Resolution of this conflict by holding chil-
dren engaged in adult activities to the adult standard is said to
37. Crane v. Banner, 93 Idaho 69, 73, 455 P.2d 313, 317 (1969).
38. Coleman v. Baker, 382 S.W.2d 843, 848 (Ky. 1964) (quoting Jones v. Ken-
tucky Util. Co., 334 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960)).
39. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957).
40. Holcomb v. Gilbraith, 257 Ark. 32, -, 513 S.W.2d 796, 797 (1974); Mann v.
Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d 342, 346, 366 P.2d 603, 606 (1961).
41. Studer v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Cal. 400, 53 P. 942 (1898) (12-year-old's
attempt to pass between railroad cars stalled on the street bordered on
recklessness); Colomb v. Portland & Brunswick St. Ry., 100 Me. 418, 61 A.
898 (1905) (10-year-old plaintiff did not meet burden of showing no contrib-
utory negligence; her act of crossing track in front of moving car was either
unthinking impulse or reckless daring); Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-
Houston Elec. Light Co., 78 Neb. 24, 110 N.W. 711, aff'd on rehearing, 78
Neb. 27, 113 N.W. 526 (1907) (12-year-old knew he would be injured by
touching power line).
42. Johnston v. New Omaha-Houston Elec. Light Co., 78 Neb. 24, 110 N.W. 711,
aff'd on rehearing, 78 Neb. 27, 113 N.W. 526 (1907), has been described as a
case involving an extreme situation, and its law limited to the facts of that
case. Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431,37 N.W.2d 607
(1949); Rule v. Claar Transfer & Storage Co. 102 Neb. 4, 165 N.W. 883 (1917).
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be gaining approval among American jurisdictions.43 An exam-
ple of the cases applying this adult-activities exception to the
general rule requiring a subjective standard for children was a
personal injury suit by a twelve-year-old bicyclist who was
struck by a sixteen-year-old motorist.44 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court reviewed its prior "child's standard of care" cases, noted
that each involved a child engaged "in activities commensurate
with his age," and stated:
The [child's standard] instruction complained of permits a minor to
engage in adult activities which expose others to hazards, while im-
posing only a child's standard of care on the minor so engaged. This
legal sanction is impractical and contrary to the circumstances of
modern life. We hold that a minor, when operating an automobile,
must exercise the same standard of care as an adult.
45
Operating a motorcycle has similarly been held to be an adult
activity which subjects a minor to the objective adult standard
when his contributory negligence is considered.
46
One rationale for the "adult activities" exception is the idea
that children so engaged are no less likely to cause accidents
with catastrophic consequences than are adults:
[I]t would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in the operation of
a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and conduct
than those expected of all others. A person observing children at play
... may anticipate conduct that does not reach an adult standard of
care or prudence. However, one cannot know whether the operator of
an approaching automobile. . . is a minor or an adult. .... 4.
At least two questions are suggested by such language. Is the
subjective standard of care limited to minors engaged only in
play? If not, how does a child know whether he is indulging in
the activities of an adult? It has been said that "activities appro-
priate" to childhood include walking, running, playing, and
bicycling.48 But, taking the last of these as the more extreme
example, is it logical that a sixteen-year-old is judged by the
subjective child's standard when he runs down and injures
another with a bicycle and yet is judged by the adult standard
when he causes the same damage with a motorcycle? The same
question may be asked in regard to a minor's negligence
contributing to his own injury. Concern for the catastrophes
that may be caused by such adult activities as driving auto-
mobiles hints that the true distinction is not between what
adults and children normally do, but between activities more or
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 32.
44. Baxter v. Fugett, 425 P.2d 462 (Okla. 1967).
45. Id. at 464.
46. Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 224 A.2d 63 (1966).
47. Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961) (footnote
omitted).
48. Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 408, 224 A.2d 63, 64 (1966).
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less prone to result in significant injury. It might even be rea-
sonable to speculate that an adult standard is applied to ac-
tivities more prone to serious injury, notably driving, because
these are also activities which are more typically accompanied
by liability insurance coverage.
Another rationale for the adult activities exception in cases
in which minors were driving motor vehicles has been the ab-
sence of a dualistic standard of care in state rules-of-the-road
statutes.49 While it is certainly correct that separate standards
for children and adults do not exist, the opinions employing this
argument lack clarity as to the relevance of their absence to
court-made negligence law.50 Indeed, the law generally is replete
with special standards for children.51
Until a court which accepts the adult activities exception
better articulates its rationale, it would seem that, except in
such extreme cases as driving cars and playing hide-and-go-
seek, the exception is susceptible of case-by-case application
and the uncertainty attendant thereto.
D. Interface with Other Tort Doctrines.
The subjective child's standard of care has implications for
other established doctrines of negligence law. Chief among
these doctrines are risk assumption and negligence per se.
As to risk assumption, it appears the courts which created a
subjective standard for minors accused of contributory negli-
gence are spared the trouble of doing the same for minors ac-
cused of risk assumption. Generally, assumption of risk bars
from recovery a plaintiff who assumes a risk of negligent in-
jury.52 But, unless the risk is assumed by an express agreement
which is not invalid as contrary to public policy,53 a plaintiff
does not assume the risk of the defendant's conduct unless he
knows of that risk's existence and appreciates its unreasonable
character.5 4 Even for adults, then, subjective elements of knowl-
49. Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407,224 A.2d 63 (1966); Baxter v. Fugett, 425 P.2d
462 (Okla. 1967). The rules-of-the-road statutes are those statutes which
govern the operation of motor vehicles upon the streets and highways
within each state. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 39-601 to 6,195 (Reissue 1974).
50. Id. For example, the New Hampshire Court cited a statute making it a
misdemeanor for "any person" to do something forbidden in that state's
rules of the road as "some indication" of legislative intent that the court-
made adult standard of care should apply to every person, including
minors. Daniels v. Evans, 107 N.H. 407, 409-10, 224 A.2d 63, 65 (1966).
51. See, e.g., notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
53. Id. § 496B.
54. Id. § 496D.
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edge and appreciation (not present in the objective adult test for
contributory negligence) are necessary to find that a plaintiff
assumed the risk of harm. Since a child's standard of care for
contributory negligence is typically a subjective inquiry,5 5 there
appears little distinction between the two defenses when alleged
against a minor. Enlightening in this regard is the parallel lan-
guage to be found in a New York case which considered
whether a minor decedent was contributorily negligent or as-
sumed the risk of harm and thus barred his parent from recov-
ering, under a dram-shop law, from the tavern owner who sold
the youth liquor:
[A]n infant [in regard to contributory negligence] must exercise the
care which an ordinary prudent person of his age, capacity and expe-
rience would have exercised under similar circumstances . . . . An
infant may assume the risk of injury ...and, under the circum-
stances of this case, considering the decedent's age of nearly eighteen
years, his intellectual capacity and experience, the court holds that he
assumed the risks inherent in voluntarily exposing himself to the
dangers in the consumption of alcoholic beverages .... 56
In a case involving a minor of tender years, in a jurisdiction
where such children are incapable of negligence, a court noted
the close kinship of the doctrines of contributory negligence and
risk assumption5 7 and held a child of tender years incapable of
"knowingly and voluntarily assuming a risk of harm. '5 8
In jurisdictions where there exists the tort doctrine that vio-
lation of a statute constitutes negligence per se when the
violator injures another as a result of the violation,5 9 there is an
obvious tension with the special subjective standard of care
applied to minors accused of negligence. When a minor violates
a statute in such a jurisdiction, one or the other of the doctrines
must yield; a child can hardly be negligent per se and yet re-
quired to meet only a child's subjective standard of care.60 This
55. See § II-B of text supra.
56. McNally v. Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 225-26, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157, 179-80 (Sup. Ct.
1970). Accord, Laney v. Stubbs, 217 So. 2d 468; 474 (La. App. 1968), aff'd on
other grounds, 255 La. 84, 229 So. 2d 708 (1969).
57. Bennet v. Gitzen, 29 Colo. App. 271, 274, 484 P.2d 811, 812 (1971).
58. Id. at 275, 484 P.2d at 813.
59. E.g., Iowa has such a doctrine, as summarized in a 1972 case in which the
defendant city argued the plaintiff was negligent per se:
The city relies solely on our decisions holding violation of a rule-
of-the-road statute fixing the standard of care, in absence of legal
excuse, is negligence per se. We have not extended this rigid rule to
other tort cases involving breach of a statute or ordinance. In those
situations we have said each case is to be decided in light of the
purpose and intent of the pertinent statute or ordinance.
Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1972).
60. In jurisdictions accepting the "adult activities" exception to the subjective
child's standard of care, this tension would arise in fewer cases, since many
statutory violations (notably of motor vehicle laws) would arise only when
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conflict has been resolved in some jurisdictions by holding that
a child cannot be negligent per se even though an adult in the
same situation would have been.61 The conflict, however, has
also been resolved otherwise.62 And of course, the conflict need
not be resolved at all-because it does not exist-in jurisdictions
in which violation of a statute is merely some evidence of negli-
gence and not negligence per se.63
No survey of tort law's special consideration for children
would becomplete without some mention of the legal favoritism
embodied in the doctrine of attractive nuisance. Although the
rule is variously stated 64 and in some jurisdictions flatly reject-
ed,65 its focus is obviously the protection of children, even
though they are trespassers on the property of others. In most
cases in which the rule has been applied, the minors were of
relatively tender age, 66 although the Restatement of Torts pred-
minors are engaged in adult activities. See § II-C of text supra. See also
Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Iowa 1972) (dictum
implying per se rule might apply when child is engaged in adult activity).
61. Alley v. Siepman, 87 S.D. 670, 676, 214 N.W.2d 7, 11 (1974):
Where a minor not engaged in a primarily adult activity violates a
statute or ordinance, that violation does not in and of itself consti-
tute negligence per se, but may be considered in determining
whether the minor met the special standard of conduct which
would ordinarily be exercised by a minor of like age, intelligence,
experience and capacity under similar circumstances.
Accord, Brown v. Connolly, 206 Cal. App. 2d 582, 24 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1962);
Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972); Simmons v.
Holm, 229 Or. 373, 367 P.2d 368 (1961).
62. Tittle v. McCombs, 129 Ga. App. 148, 199 S.E.2d 363 (1973) (minority of
motorcyclist not considered in affirming trial court's instruction that jury
could find the youth violated the statute and was, therefore, negligent per
se).
63. Seeman v. Pagels, 184 Neb. 757, 172 N.W.2d 100 (1969).
64. One formulation is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965):
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to
children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon
the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has
reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve
an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such chil-
dren, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and
the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with
the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate
the danger or otherwise to protect the children.
65. E.g., Prudhomme v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 352 Mass. 767,225 N.E.2d 592 (1967).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339, Comment c (1965).
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icates a property possessor's liability on injuries to any child
"too young to appreciate the danger. '67
III. NEBRASKA LAW
A. Standard of Care of Minors
Nebraska's adoption of the subjective standard of care for
children who are faced with charges of primary or contributory
negligence is of early vintage. In Huff v. Ames 68 the Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld a district court's refusal to apply an
adult standard of care to an eleven-year-old plaintiff who lost
two fingers while feeding sugar cane into a crushing mill.69 The
plaintiff alleged that his employer, the owner of the mill, was
negligent. The court in Huff approved language which instruct-
ed the jury that "the rule as to contributive negligence of a child
is, that it is required to exercise only that degree of care which a
person of the age of this plaintiff would naturally and ordinari-
ly use in the same situation and under the same circum-
stances. °7 0 By its selection of authority for this holding, it ap-
pears the court in Huff was not interested in adopting any
presumptions of capacity of relatively young or old minors.71 In
passing, it should be noted that in other early cases involving
claims of negligence against infants' employers the negligence
allegation itself, as well as the minor plaintiffs' standard, pro-
vided special treatment for children.72 In these cases, defendant
employers were sued for negligently failing to advise minors of
risks in employment, although no such warnings were due adult
employees.73
67. Id.
68. 16 Neb. 139, 19 N.W. 623 (1884).
69. Id. at 141, 19 N.W. at 624.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 142, 19 N.W. at 624:
In Wait's Actions and Defenses, vol. 4, 720 it is said: "The rule of
law in regard to the negligence of an adult and in regard to that of
an infant ten years of age is materially different. . . . Of an infant
of tender years less discretion is required, and the degree depends
upon his age and knowledge. Of a child of three years of age, less
caution would be required than of seven, and of a child of seven
less than one of twelve or fifteen. The caution required is according
to the maturity and capacity of the child, and this is to be deter-
mined in each case by the circumstances of that case."
72. See Collins v. Weise, 110 Neb. 522, 194 N.W. 450 (1923); Breedlove v. Gates,
91 Neb. 765, 137 N.W. 871 (1912); Atner Brick Co. v. Killian, 67 Neb. 589, 93
N.W. 951 (1903); Omaha Bottling Co. v. Theiler, 59 Neb. 257, 80 N.W. 821
(1899).
73. Cases in this area focus on the issue of risk assumption. See notes 162-68
infra.
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The child's standard of care formulated in Huff was carried
forward and fleshed out in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail-
road v. Grablin"4 which adopted as the "correct rule" a head-
note from Huff which went beyond the criterion of age as
stated 75 in Huff: "[I]n determining whether or not the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence [the jury] should take into con-
sideration his age and discretion in determining that fact
.... 76 Grablin went on to add "prudence" to age and discre-
tion in articulating the child's standard of care.7
Subsequent expressions of the standard applicable to minors
have added to the elements of age, discretion, and prudence
these considerations: intelligence and experience7 8 knowledge
and appreciation of danger,79 and physical and mental devel-
opment.8 0 These elements have sustained substantial interming-
ling and alternative use over the course of time.81 The essence of
these various verbalizations of the child's standard of care has
been captured in a short-hand phraseology which has had fairly
consistent usage since articulated in 1949.82 The standard is
"that degree of care which an ordinary prudent child of the
same capacity to appreciate and avoid danger would use in the
same situation."83 This language has enjoyed considerable cur-
rency in Nebraska child negligence cases.84
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in the recent case of Caradori
v. Fitch,8 once again approved this short-hand language when
it upheld a jury instruction which "recited that a minor is held to
the exercise of that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
74. 38 Neb. 90, 56 N.W. 796 (1893).
75. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
76. 38 Neb. at 100, 56 N.W. at 798.
77. "All that the law requires of such an infant is that he exercise that care,
discretion, and prudence which may reasonably be expected from children
of like age." Id. at 100, 56 N.W. at 798.
78. Crabtree v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 86 Neb. 33, 45, 124 N.W. 932, 936 (1910).
79. Rule v. Claar Transfer & Storage Co., 102 Neb. 4,7,165 N.W. 883, 884 (1917).
80. Collins v. Weise, 110 Neb. 552, 559, 194 N.W. 450, 453 (1923).
81. Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 765, 241 N.W. 535, 536 (1932) (age, discre-
tion and experience); Kauffman v. Fundaburg, 123 Neb. 340, 344, 242 N.W.
658, 660 (1932) (age, experience and intelligence); Vacanti v. Montes, 180
Neb. 232,237, 142 N.W.2d 318,322 (1966) (knowledge, discretion and appreci-
ation of danger).
82. Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607
(1949).
83. Id. at 438, 37 N.W.2d at 611.
84. See, e.g., Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299, 301-02, 226 N.W.2d 632, 634
(1975); Vacanti v. Montes, 180 Neb. 232, 237,142 N.W.2d 318,322 (1966); Bear
v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756,768,83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957); Adams v. Welliver, 155
Neb. 331, 341, 51 N.W.2d 739, 745 (1952).
85. 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978).
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child of the same capacity to apprecite [sic] and avoid danger
would use."86 The court said that this instruction, given in a case
in which an eleven-year-old girl was struck and killed by a
motorist while the girl was riding a bicycle on an unlighted
street after dark, was consistent with Nebraska law.
87
In Armer v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway, 8 more
than in subsequent cases, the court gave meaning to its standard
and discussed the underlying considerations. In Armer the su-
preme court reversed a trial court's finding as a matter of law
that an eleven-year-old girl whose bicycle collided with a bus
was contributorily negligent.8 9 In rather eloquent language, 0
Justice Boslaugh stated the significance of the minor's subjec-
tive standard of care: mere knowledge of danger is not the
relevant issue; rather it is appreciation of the "necessity for
keeping away from, or not doing" certain things.91
Ordinarily, as in any ultimate fact issue in negligence cases,
whether a child met the standard of care is a question for the
jury.92 The exceptional cases are those in which a very young
child is said to have no capacity for negligence as a matter of
law,93 and those in which a child's actions are so extreme as to
86. Id. at 189, 263 N.W.2d at 652.
87. Id.
88. 151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607 (1949).
89. Id. at 437-38, 37 N.W.2d at 610-11:
The conduct of appellant as shown by this record should not,
her age considered, conclusively bar her right of recovery, conced-
ing that she was a bright, intelligent girl; had lived in Omaha and
had on occasions ridden bicycles on the streets for two years; and
was as familiar with the operations of vehicles and bicycles on the
street as any girl of her age and discretion would usually be.
90. Id. at 438, 37 N.W.2d at 611:
She doubtless knew that there was danger of injury in traveling in
the street and in turning to the left to cross the street. Nearly any
child of her age would answer, if asked, that it knew if it fell in the
river it might be drowned; if it fell in the fire it would be burned; or
if it got in the way of a street or a motor vehicle it would be injured
and possibly killed; but mere childish knowledge of everyday
things does not necessarily establish that they appreciate or under-
stand the necessity for keeping away from, or not doing these
things. They act on impulse, and often the greater the danger, the
greater the challenge. They do dangerous things without thought of
the consequences that may follow what they do, and to conclude as
a matter of law that a child of such an age as the appellant should
be held to the high standards demanded of adults in looking after
their own and the safety of others is opposed to good judgment and
sound law. The infant is favored by the law not so much on his lack
of knowledge as because of indiscretion, imprudence, lack of judg-
ment, and impulsiveness.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 437, 37 N.W.2d at 610.
93. See § III-B of text infra.
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make the child negligent as a matter of law.94 It appears this
latter extreme-situation exception has been applied only once in
Nebraska. In Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec-
tric Light Co.,95 the supreme court found a twelve-year-old boy
contributorily negligent as a matter of law, reversing a jury
verdict for the boy. He was injured when he touched an electric
wire and the court said the evidence showed that the boy anti-
cipated and deliberately sought a shock, although he may not
have appreciated the extent of the injury he was to incur.96
However, subsequent courts have declined opportunities to ap-
ply Johnston and, while not overturning the case, have consis-
tently expressed the need to severely restrict the extreme-situa-
tion exception. 97 With seventy years now passed since Johnston,
and twenty years since the court's last discussion of the excep-
tion,98 there is room for speculation that a situation sufficiently
extreme will never again be found. Instead, it would appear, the
cases in which minor plaintiffs' behavior is outrageous are
analyzed by inquiring (1) whether it was the minors' acts, and
not those of the defendants, which proximately caused the acci-
dent,99 or (2) whether the defendants simply were not negli-
gent. 100
B. Capacity of Children to be Chargeable with Negligence
It is not at all clear from the Nebraska cases whether inquiry
into the capacity of children is analytically separate from in-
quiry into whether a particular child met his standard of care. 101
Here "capacity" for negligence is used in the sense of "capabili-
ty" of being held responsible for acts, and not in the sense of a
child's mental abilities, as was apparently the meaning of the
standard of care articulated in Armer v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs Street Railway.10 2 While related, these meanings are dis-
tinguishable; the first meaning refers to childrens' legal capac-
ity to be chargeable with negligence, while the second refers to
the degree of mental capacity a child may have to appreciate
and avoid danger. In a sense, it could be said, findings of legal
94. Johnston v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Elec. Light Co., 78 Neb. 24, 110
N.W. 711, aff'd on rehearing, 78 Neb. 27, 113 N.W. 526 (1907).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 31, 110 N.W. at 712.
97. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 769, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567-68 (1957); Armer v.
Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431,439,37 N.W.2d 607, 612 (1949);
Rule v. Claar Transfer & Storage Co., 102 Neb. 4,7, 165 N.W. 883,884 (1917).
98. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 83 N.W.2d 559 (1957).
99. De Griselles v. Gans, 116 Neb. 835, 843, 219 N.W. 235, 238 (1928).
100. Crabtree v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 86 Neb. 33, 38, 124 N.W. 932, 934 (1910).
101. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra.
102. 151 Neb. 431, 37 N.W.2d 607 (1949). See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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incapacity for negligence are judicial recognition that mental
capacity can be so weak (in very young children) that it would
be ludicrous to apply a standard of care at all.10 3
Apparently responsible for the lack of clarity in the Nebras-
ka Supreme Court's analytical framework is its holdings that
the determination of whether children of a certain age are
chargeable with negligence, like the determination of whether a
particular child met his standard of care, is normally a question
of fact for the jury.10 4 The problem is that capacity for negli-
gence and the issue of whether a particular child met the stan-
dard of care are not the same fact question, as may have been
recognized by the court in Vacanti v. Montes.105 There, the court
approved a jury instruction which appeared to distinguish the
two fact questions. 10 6 But if this was a conscious distinction, it is
apparently not one about which the Nebraska court is very
concerned; in Gadeken v. Langhorst 7 the court did not bat a
judicial eye as it merged the two inquiries. 10 8 And, in its most
103. Legal capacity and incapacity are distinguishable from determinations of
negligence or no negligence as matters of law. The former is applied to a
group of children who are similar in age and mentality; the latter is applied
to a particular child in a given case.
104. Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299, 301, 226 N.W.2d 632, 634 (1975); Vacan-
ti v. Montes, 180 Neb. 232, 237, 142 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1966); Adams v. Welliver,
155 Neb. 331, 340, 51 N.W.2d 739, 744-45 (1952); Armer v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry., 151 Neb. 431, 437, 37 N.W.2d 607, 610 (1949).
105. 180 Neb. 232, 142 N.W.2d 318 (1966).
106. Id. at 238, 142 N.W.2d at 322. The jury instruction was quoted by the court
as follows:
The evidence is uncontroverted in this case that at the time of
the accident in question the plaintiff was a minor of the age of 9
years and 3 months.
You are instructed that a minor of the age of the plaintiff at the
time of the accident cannot be charged with the same degree of
caution required of an adult in guarding against possible accidents
while traveling upon and crossing a street in a city. There is no
arbitrary rule fixing the time at which a child during his minority
may be declared wholly capable or incapable of understanding and
avoiding dangers to be encountered while engaged in such activity.
Whether or not negligence may be attributed to a minor of the age
of the plaintiff is a matter for the jury to determine under all the
circumstances of the case.
The degree of care required of a minor is that which an ordinari-
ly prudent child of the same capacity to appreciate and avoid
danger would use in the same situation.
Whether or not the plaintiff at the time of the accident in ques-
tion was of sufficient knowledge, discretion and appreciation of
danger that she may be subject to the defense of contributory
negligence is a question of fact for the jury to determine.
(emphasis added). Note that the first question of fact concerns "a" minor,
while the second concerns "the" plaintiff.
107. 193 Neb. 299, 226 N.W.2d 632 (1975).
108. Id. at 301-02, 226 N.W.2d at 634:
The plaintiff was 11 years of age at the time of the accident.
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recent negligence case involving a minor, the supreme court did
not mention as an issue the legal capacity to be chargeable with
negligence of the plaintiffs' eleven-year-old decedent. 0 9
The appropriate question concerning this silent merger
would seem to be, not whether it was for better or for worse, but
whether it really matters. Instructing a jury to make two factual
determinations which are for practical purposes the same" 0
would be pointless. Thus, the merger may be a practical way of
avoiding arbitrary rules on the capacity of minors to be charge-
able with negligence."' Besides, in the cases in which capacity
to be chargeable with negligence is of substantial significance,
that is, when the minors are very young, capacity does receive
separate attention."2
Implicit in the merger of the capacity inquiry into the subjec-
tive standard of care inquiry is the idea that there is no age
below which a minor is not chargeable with negligence and
above which he is so chargeable."3 When this idea is applied to
real cases, the result is that "[w]hether or not negligence may be
attributed to a minor of the age of the plaintiff is usually a
matter for a jury under the circumstances of each case.""14
But the pronouncement that there is no arbitrary age below
which a minor is not chargeable with negligence is misleading in
its generality. While the adoption of this subjective con-
sideration of capacity appears to place Nebraska squarely in
the camp of jurisdictions which reject arbitrary rules and pre-
sumptions," 5 there is a substantial line of cases, beginning with
Sacca v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Railway,"6 which
hold that a child of tender years is not chargeable with negli-
gence.
"Tender years" is, to say the least, a vague concept. On the
Whether negligence may be attributed to a minor 11 years of age is
usually a question of fact for the jury . . .The plaintiff was re-
quired to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
child of the same capacity to appreciate and avoid danger would
use in the same situation.
109. Caradori v. Fitch, 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978).
110. See text accompanying notes 112-14 infra.
111. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
113. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957): "There is no
arbitrary rule fixing the time at which a child during his minority may be
declared wholly capable or incapable of understanding and avoiding dan-
gers to be encountered while engaged in such an activity." Accord, Vacanti
v. Montes, 180 Neb. 232, 238, 142 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1966).
114. Bear v. Auguy, 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957).
115. See note 27 supra.
116. 98 Neb. 73, 152 N.W. 315 (1915).
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one hand, it has been said that any person in his minority is of
tender years and, therefore, entitled to the protection of the
law.117 In line with this definition and the general pronounce-
ment against arbitrary rules, in pre-Sacca cases the minor par-
ties' tenderness entitled them only to a jury's scrutiny under the
subjective child's standard of care; 118 incapacity to be charge-
able with negligence was not considered. But, starting with Sac-
ca, "tender years" took on a second meaning, and children of
very tender years began to receive more favorable con-
sideration. It is not clear whether the Sacca court held the six-
year-old plaintiff not contributorily negligent as a matter of
law"19 or not chargeable with negligence because he was of
"such tender years." 120 The result, of course, was the same: the
issue of the minor's negligence was said to have been correctly
withheld from the jury by the trial judge.121 In dissent, it was
argued that the boy's possible contributory negligence in run-
ning into a street car was not the real issue, rather the issue was
the defense that the defendant conductor was not negligent at
all and the boy's actions were the sole proximate cause.122 This
conceptualization of the accident's cause has been carried forth
in later cases as a caveat to the "tender years" exception to the
general rule that there is no particular age at which capacity for
negligence arises. 123
De Griselles v. Gans,'124 in which the defendant truck driver
was found to have been in no way negligent in colliding with a
boy of about nine,125 signaled explicit recognition of the in-
capacity of young children to be chargeable with negligence. 126
117. Collins v. Weise, 110 Neb. 552,559, 194 N.W. 450,453 (1923) (youth, 16, was of
tender years).
118. Crabtree v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 86 Neb. 33, 124 N.W. 932 (1910) (nine-year-
old); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Grablin, 38 Neb. 90,56 N.W. 796
(1893) (nine-year-old); Huff v. Ames, 16 Neb. 139, 19 N.W. 623 (1884) (1 1-year-
old).
119. 98 Neb. at 76, 152 N.W. at 316:
Without attempting to fix the exact age at which a child may be said
to be responsible for his acts, and capable of being guilty of negli-
gence, we believe that this child, who was under six years of age,
cannot, under all the circumstances of the case, be charged with
negligence ....
120. Id. "The child was of such tender years that it cannot be deemed in law
possessed of sufficient discretion to make it guilty of negligence for its
failure to exercise due care for its safety."
121. Id.
122. Id. at 78-79, 152 N.W. at 317.
123. See § III-C of text infra.
124. 116 Neb. 835, 219 N.W. 235 (1928).
125. Id. at 845, 219 N.W. at 239.
126. Id. at 843, 219 N.W. at 238: "The plaintiff's decedent, on account of his
tender age, is not chargeable with contributory negligence .... "
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Although this recognition was apparently dictum (the defend-
ant's lack of negligence decided the case), non-dictum state-
ments of the incapacity of very young minors followed.127 In
McKinney v. Wintersteen,128 the court held that the defendant
automobile driver was not prejudiced by an instruction submit-
ting to the jury an issue of the six-year-old plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence in running into the car. 129 The reason given by
the court was that the youngster was incapable of negligence
anyway. 30 In Siedlik v. Schneider,'3' the court reversed and
remanded a small verdict from which a seven-year-old plaintiff
appealed because the trial court's instructions may have caused
the jury to consider contributory negligence of the boy.132 "A
child of tender years-and it must be conceded that the plaintiff
was a child of tender years-is not chargeable with negligence
or with contributory negligence.' ' 33
A later case, Tews v. Bamrick, 34 provided perhaps the clear-
est distinction between capacity to be chargeable with negli-
gence and negligence or no negligence as a matter of law. In
Tews a five-year-old boy was struck by a truck. Affirming a
verdict for the boy, the court said: "It can be here said that the
conduct of the boy was undoubtedly negligent, but we have
often said a child of tender years is not chargeable with contrib-
utory negligence."'' 35 Subsequent Nebraska courts have recog-
nized the "tender years" exception to the general rule that there
is no arbitrary age for determining capacity to be chargeable
with negligence.1
36
The more recent cases discussing capacity have involved
children less tender in years; the general rule expressed in Bear
v. Auguy,'13 7 and not the exception for "tender years," has been
applied. 3 8 Since nearly twenty years have elapsed since the last
127. McKinney v. Wiritersteen, 122 Neb. 679, 241 N.W. 112 (1932); Siedlik v.
Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 241 N.W. 535 (1932).
128. 122 Neb. 679, 241 N.W. 112 (1932).
129. Id. at 682, 241 N.W. at 114.
130. Id.
131. 122 Neb. 763, 241 N.W. 535 (1932).
132. Id. at 765, 241 N.W. at 536.
133. Id.
134. 148 Neb. 59, 26 N.W.2d 499 (1947).
135. Id. at 66, 26 N.W.2d at 504.
136. Adams v. Welliver, 155 Neb. 331, 51 N.W.2d 739 (1952) (tender years cases
involved minors under seven; exception not to be applied to nine-year-old);
Connors v. Pantano, 165 Neb. 515, 86 N.W.2d 367 (1957) (incapacity of four-
year-old to commit intentional tort); Eden v. Klaas, 166 Neb. 354,89 N.W.2d
74 (1958) (five-year-old); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959)
(under two years of age).
137. 164 Neb. 756, 768, 83 N.W.2d 559, 567 (1957). See text accompanying note 110
supra.
138. Caradori v. Fitch, 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978); Vacanti v. Montes,
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case 39 which applied the "tender years" exception, it seems
appropriate to question the exception's continued vitality.
Two 1975 cases considered the capacity of minor plaintiffs to
be contributorily negligent. Gadeken v. Langhorst,140 involved a
plaintiff who, at the age of eleven, was injured when her bicycle
collided with the defendant's automobile at an intersection. In
reversing the trial court's dismissal of the girl's action and re-
manding the case, the court held that the evidence, when con-
sidered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, created a jury
question as to the defendant's negligence.' 4 ' The court in Gade-
ken said the issue of whether negligence could be attributed to
an eleven-year-old is also a jury question, thus applying the
general rule as articulated in Bear.142 The court's failure in
Gadeken to discuss "tender years" is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the exception's continued viability, in light of the age
of the child involved. The same may be said of the supreme
court's nondiscussion of "tender years" in the 1978 case of
Caradori v. Fitch,'143 which also involved an eleven-year-old
plaintiff.
More revealing is Korbelik v. Johnson,4 4 in which a five-
year-old plaintiff was struck by the defendant's automobile in a
school crosswalk. The court affirmed a verdict for the defend-
ant, explaining that the jury could deny recovery by finding the
child's actions were the sole proximate cause of her injury. 45
The court in Korbelik dismissed an objection raised by the
plaintiff that jury instructions on sole proximate cause conflict-
ed with the trial judge's determination "as a matter of law that
Jamie L. Korbelik, because of her age at the time of the acci-
dent, cannot be charged with negligence or contributory negli-
gence."'146 The supreme court appeared to make a back-handed
affirmation of the "tender years" exception when it wrote:
"There is no merit to plaintiff's first contention. Even if a child
180 Neb. 232, 142 N.W.2d 318 (1966) (nine-year-old); Sacca v. Marshall, 180
Neb. 855, 146 N.W.2d 375 (1966) (14-year-old).
139. Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 222, 99 N.W.2d 16, 24 (1959) (arguably dic-
tum). An instruction mentioning the incapacity of very young children to
be chargeable with negligence before stating the general child's standard
of care was approved in Sacca v. Marshall, 180 Neb. 855, 867, 146 N.W.2d
375, 383 (1966). However, the minor in the case was fourteen and the court
only discussed the general standard of care.
140. 193 Neb. 299, 226 N.W.2d 632 (1975).
141. Id. at 301, 226 N.W.2d at 634.
142. Id.
143. 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978).
144. 193 Neb. 356, 227 N.W.2d 21 (1975).
145. See § III-C of text infra.
146. 193 Neb. at 360, 227 N.W.2d at 24.
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is not capable of contributory negligence, if such child's
conduct can be considered the sole proximate cause of his in-
jury, there can be no recovery."'14
C. Sole Proximate Cause and the Adult Standard
Despite the special consideration granted children in the neg-
ligence law of Nebraska and other jurisdictions, all is not gloom
for the adult who has the greater misfortune to injure a child
one day before, rather than one day after, the child's majority.
Nor will the adult inevitably lose when the child with whom he
has an accident is of tender years. As Korbelik demonstrates, 148
even a child too young to be chargeable with contributory negli-
gence may not recover when it is the child's act which is the sole
proximate cause of his injury. Or, as it is sometimes expressed,
the defendant must have been negligent to be liable.149
In Nebraska, this fundamental concept of a proximate cause
requirement in child negligence cases pre-dates the preferential
subjective standard of care for children which originated in the
1884 case of Huff v. Ames. 150 In Meyer v. Midland Pacific Rail-
road,151 a train struck a brother and sister, killing the boy (two
years old) and so injuring the girl (over three) that her leg was
amputated; a jury awarded the girl $10,000.152 In reversing and
remanding for a new trial, the court in Meyer said that, while
the engineer had a duty to exercise great care, there was no
evidence "tending even to show the child was seen ... or that
she was in a position where she could have been seen by the
engineer one moment sooner than she was."'153 Finding no negli-
gence by the defendant, the court apparently saw no need to
discuss possible contributory negligence by the girl.
Express comment on proximate cause in negligence cases
involving minors was made in De Griselles v. Gans,154 in which
the court reversed a verdict for the deceased minor's father:
147. Id. at 361, 227 N.W.2d at 24 (emphasis added).
148. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
149. Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 765, 241 N.W. 535, 536 (1932):
[That a child of tender years cannot be negligent] does not mean
that the defendant was the insurer of plaintiff's safety or that
the defendant would be responsible for injuries received by the
plaintiff which were caused by the recklessness or carelessness of
the plaintiff alone with which there was no negligence on the part
of the defendant.
150. 16 Neb. 139, 19 N.W. 623 (1884). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
151. 2 Neb. 319 (1872).
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id. at 338.
154. 116 Neb. 835, 219 N.W. 235 (1928). See text accompanying note 125 supra.
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The plaintiff's decedent, on account of his tender age, is not charge-
able with contributory negligence, but in determining the existence of
negligence upon the part of the defendant, having no notice of the
presence of children, the same rules apply [as where an adult is
struck] ... and while the boy is not chargeable with negligence, if his
act, whether negligent or not, was the proximate cause of his death,
there can be no recovery.
155
Clearly, a minor plaintiff must, like his adult counterpart, estab-
lish a prima facie case of negligence.
While the adult defendant is entitled to put his minor plaintiff
to the proof of the adult's negligence, the law will sometimes
help the child with his burden. In the typical child-darting-in-
front-of-a-car case, the Nebraska Supreme Court has made rele-
vant to the inquiry of whether the defendant met his standard of
care the defendant's knowledge of children in the vicinity of the
accident. This adjustment to the adult standard of care was
perhaps foreshadowed in the court's interest in Meyer in
whether the train engineer saw or could have seen the young-
sters near the track.
15 6
Initially, this adjustment to the defendant's standard was
rather inartfully stated in Kauffman v. Fundaburg: 1 7 "The
driver . . . must exercise more care toward a child of tender
years crossing the street between blocks than toward an adult in
the same circumstances. ' 158 The problem with this assertion,
which received no additional embellishment when transcribed
as a headnote to the case, was that it did not account for an
important fact in the case-the driver had knowledge of the
presence of children in the immediate vicinity.1 59 Without this
element, it would otherwise appear that a driver who strikes a
child, even where there is no warning of the presence of young-
sters, is held to a higher standard of care than a driver who
strikes an adult.
It is clear, however, that the unqualified proposition in
Kauffman was an aberrational use of language that ought not
be depended upon by a minor plaintiff's lawyer.1 60 The more
155. Id. at 843, 219 N.W. at 238. Accord, Korbelik v. Johnston, 193 Neb. 356, 361,
227 N.W.2d 21, 24 (1975); Gadeken v. Langhorst, 193 Neb. 299, 301, 226
N.W.2d 632, 634 (1975); Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 765, 241 N.W. 535,
536 (1932).
156. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
157. 123 Neb. 340, 242 N.W. 658 (1932) (nine-year-old struck by truck while
crossing an Omaha street).
158. Id. at 344, 242 N.W. at 660.
159. Id. at 342-43, 242 N.W. at 659.
160. See, e.g., De Griselles v. Gans, 116 Neb. 835, 843,219 N.W. 235, 238 (1928): A
driver "is not bound to anticipate that conduct of children, of whose pres-
ence he has no knowledge, will be different from that of an ordinarily
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artful approach, explicitly approved by the supreme court, is to
describe presence of children as one circumstance in determin-
ing the care due from a driver: "A motorist who observes or
should reasonably anticipate the presence of children in the
highway is obliged to use reasonable care in view of all the
circumstances. '16
1
D. Assumption of Risk and Negligence Per Se
The tort doctrine of risk assumption poses no significant
issue in Nebraska's law of negligence involving minors. 16 2 The
cases discussing risk assumption by minors arose in another
era, when child labor and the advent of industrialization made
the doctrine a livelier one than it now appears to be in regard to
minor plaintiffs. Within the context of the master-servant rela-
tionship, an early case on risk assumption, Omaha Bottling
Company v. Theiler,163 stated:
The general rule is that infants, like adults, assume the ordinary risks
of the service in which they engage. They are entitled, however, to
warning of dangers which, on account of their youth and inexperi-
ence, they do not fully comprehend .... But whether the plaintiff in
this case, by reason of his youth or lack of experience, was ignorant of
the dangers . . . was for the jury to determine from the evidence
164
The court in Theiler also noted that the defendant employer's
duty to warn is not absolute, but only that of a "prudent mas-
ter."'165 Subsequent master-minor servant cases have followed
the court's lead as set out in Theiler. 66
The lack of discussion on risk assumption in the more recent
cases may be attributable to the fact that the subjective inquiry
into knowledge and appreciation of the risk assumed 67 is large-
ly implicit in the subjective inquiry into a minor plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence.168
prudent person." (Emphasis added). Accord, Vacanti v. Montes, 180 Neb.
232, 237, 142 N.W.2d 318, 321 (1966); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 222, 99
N.W.2d 16, 24 (1959).
161. Adams v. Welliver, 155 Neb. 331, 342, 51 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1952) (language of
jury instruction was "correct statement of the law").
162. See § II-D of text supra.
163. 59 Neb. 257, 80 N.W. 821 (1899).
164. Id. at 262, 80 N.W. at 822.
165. Id. at 263-64, 80 N.W. at 822.
166. Collins v. Weise, 110 Neb. 552, 194 N.W. 450 (1923); Breedlove v. Gates, 91
Neb. 765, 137 N.W. 871 (1912); Ittner Brick Co. v. Killian, 67 Neb. 589, 93 N.W.
951 (1903).
167. Jensen v. Hawkins Const. Co., 193 Neb. 220, 226, 226 N.W.2d 346, 350-51
(1975). See also text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
168. Collins v. Weise, 110 Neb. 552, 194 N.W. 450 (1923) (whether 16-year-old
employee was negligent or assumed the risk were questions for the jury,
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Similarly, since in Nebraska violation of a statute is not negli-
gence per se but only evidence of negligence, 16 9 that doctrine
creates no conflict with the minor's subjective standard of
care.170 It is established, however, that violation of a statute is to
be considered as evidence of negligence against a minor. In
Sacca v. Marshall1 7' it was held reversible error not to instruct
the jury that violation of a statute by a minor is some evidence
of negligence when such an instruction would be given against
an adult. 172 More recently, in Caradori v. Fitch,17 3 the court
appeared to indicate that the jury could have concluded that the
plaintiff's minor decedent had been contributorily negligent in
riding her bicycle beside the bicycle of a companion in violation
of a Nebraska statute. 74
E. The Guest Statute
Whether all minors are subject to Nebraska's automobile
guest statute 71 is not yet settled, although it appears likely the
supreme court would hold that they are.176 Under the guest
statute a passenger in a motor vehicle who is a guest, that is, not
a passenger for hire, may not recover from the vehicle's owner
or operator for his negligence unless the driver was intoxicated
or grossly negligent. In the first case to expressly consider
whether a minor may be barred from recovery as a guest pas-
senger, it appeared the court went out of its way to allow the
child to recover. The supreme court, in Snelling v. Pieper,1
77
determined that a twelve-year-old passenger of an adult defend-
which should consider his age and experience in determining both). See
text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
169. Sacca v. Marshall, 180 Neb. 855, 865-66, 146 N.W.2d 375, 382 (1966).
170. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
171. 180 Neb. 855, 146 N.W.2d 375 (1966).
172. Id. at 866, 146 N.W.2d at 382.
173. 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978).
174. Id. at 188, 263 N.W.2d at 652. This fact appeared to have no particular
significance in the court's decision and was, therefore, dictum.
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6,191 (Reissue 1974):
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any
damages to any passenger or person riding in such motor vehicle as
a guest or by invitation and not for hire, unless such damage is
caused by the driver of such motor vehicle being under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor or because of the gross negligence of the
owner or operator in the operation of such motor vehicle. For the
purpose of this section, the term guest is hereby defined as being a
person who accepts a ride in any motor vehicle without giving
compensation therefor, but shall not be construed to apply or to
include any such passenger in a motor vehicle being demonstrated
to such passenger as a prospective purchaser.
176. Kolar v. Divis, 179 Neb. 756, 763, 140 N.W.2d 658, 663 (1966).
177. 178 Neb. 818, 135 N.W.2d 707 (1965).
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ant, who was paid fifteen dollars a week to look after the child,
was not a guest under the statute as a matter of law.178 The
youngster was, therefore, able to recover for injuries suffered
when the defendant allowed his unlicensed son to drive and the
car crashed; the recovery was based on ordinary, not gross,
negligence.19
While the court in Sneling appeared to strain to favor the
injured child,180 the apparent favoritism of minor plaintiffs in
such cases was soon curtailed. In Kolar v. Divis,181 the court
refused to exclude from the operation of the guest statute a
thirteen-year-old girl who was drowned after the car in which
she was a passenger was hit by flood waters. Her administrator,
the court said, had to show gross negligence by the defendant
driver to recover. A gratuitous passenger, the decedent, who the
court described as a "bright" and "dependable" girl, could not
be favored for her minority.182 Although the court's holding was
restricted to a thirteen-year-old under the factual circum-
stances, its discussion appeared to leave open little possibility
that a minor of even very tender years would be treated differ-
ently. 83
F. Attractive Nuisance
While it is not within the scope of this comment to discuss in
full the legal favoritism shown minors through the doctrine of
attractive nuisance in Nebraska, it is relevant to note that the
doctrine does exist in and is applied in Nebraska. In the recent
case of Davis v. Cunningham184 the supreme court had occa-
sion to discuss the doctrine of attractive nuisance in regard to a
three-year-old boy who was injured when he pulled a piece of
ditching equipment down on himself. Although the court ruled
that the owner of the land on which the child was injured could
not have reasonably foreseen the danger to children, and there-
fore dismissed the boy's action, 85 the opinion described the
nature of the attractive nuisance doctrine as it is applied in
Nebraska. A minor plaintiff, even though he be a trespasser
upon the property of his defendant, may invoke the doctrine if
the nuisance presents an unreasonable risk and it is foreseeable
that a child might be attracted to it. 86 However, a property
178. Id. at 824, 135 N.W.2d at 711.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 825, 135 N.W.2d at 712 (dissenting opinion).
181. 179 Neb. 756, 140 N.W.2d 658 (1966).
182. Id. at 763, 140 N.W.2d at 663.
183. Id. at 762-63, 140 N.W.2d at 663.
184. 196 Neb. 8, 241 N.W.2d 343 (1976).
185. Id. at 12-13, 241 N.W.2d at 346.
186. Id. at 10-11, 241 N.W.2d at 345.
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owner is not an insurer of the child's safety and has no duty to
make his property childproof. 187 Finally, the court in Davis
indicated that the doctrine itself is not favored and its principles
are not to be extended.188
G. Adult Activities
In Caradori v. Fitch,'89 the supreme court was asked by an
adult defendant whose automobile had struck and killed an
eleven-year-old bicyclist to apply an adult standard of care to
the activities of the plaintiff's deceased child. The defendant
had argued that riding a bicycle on a city street is an adult
activity and that a child engaging in such activity should be held
to the adult standard. 190 The court in Caradori rejected this
invitation to engraft upon the Nebraska law of minor negligence
an adult-activities exception to the subjective standard of care
to which children are held.' 9'
Caradori was the first case, insofar as the decisions reflect,
in which the Nebraska Supreme Court considered the adult-
activities exception. And in this 1978 case, the court's con-
sideration was indeed brief. The court cited for the adult-ac-
tivities rule the Minnesota case of Dellwo v. Pearson,1 92 in which
the relevant activity was operation of a power boat. Rather than
treating the adult- activities rule on its merits, the court quite
understandably stated: "We are not prepared, even assuming
the wisdom of the Minnesota rule, to place the activity of bicycl-
ing in the same category as power boating. ' '9 93
As a result of the court's disposition of the defendant's urg-
ing of the adult-activities rule, there now appears to be authority
that, although the adult-activities rule is not law in Nebraska, it
is not an adult activity for a child to ride a bicycle in Nebraska.
It is also apparent that consideration of the adult-activities rule
on its merits by the Nebraska Supreme Court must await a case
in which a minor plaintiff or defendant is involved in some
activity more "adult-like" than bicycling.
IV. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTARY
The Nebraska Supreme Court has long accepted a subjective
187. Id. at 11-12, 241 N.W.2d at 346.
188. Id. at 12, 241 N.W.2d at 346.
189. 200 Neb. 186, 263 N.W.2d 649 (1978).
190. Id. at 189, 263 N.W.2d at 652. For a discussion of the adult-activities doc-
trine, see notes 43-51 and accompanying text supra.
191. 200 Neb. at 186, 263 N.W.2d at 652.
192. 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961).
193. 200 Neb. at 189, 263 N.W.2d at 652.
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standard of care for children charged with primary or contribu-
tory negligence. In its most succinct form, the standard of a
child is the degree of care "which an ordinarily prudent child of
the same capacity to appreciate and avoid danger would use in
the same situation." Determining whether a particular child has
met the standard, as well as what the child's standard is, is a fact
question for the jury. While there is authority that in an extreme
situation the minor's negligence may be determined as a matter
of law, it is clear that this approach has been so severely restrict-
ed as to cast doubt upon its continued viability.
It is unclear whether, in a case involving a child beyond the
most tender years, capacity of the child to be chargeable with
negligence is a separate analytical inquiry from the ultimate
fact question of whether the child met his subjective standard of
care. However, in cases involving very young children this ca-
pacity inquiry is separate and typically has prevented the reach-
ing of the ultimate fact question; that is, a child of tender years
has no capacity for negligence.
Even in the case of a child of tender years, it is necessary that
an adult defendant have been negligent, or that the minor plain-
tiff's acts not have been the sole proximate cause of his injury.
However, in the not uncommon case of a child plaintiff injured
by an adult defendant's motor vehicle, the actual or imputed
knowledge by the driver of the presence of children in the vicini-
ty heightens the driver's duty of care.
In regard to use of the defense of risk assumption against a
minor plaintiff, it appears that the subjective nature of a child's
standard of care for avoiding contributing to his own injury
makes contributory negligence and risk assumption practically
indistinguishable defenses.
Finally, Nebraska law's favoritism of minors involved in neg-
ligence cases extends to acceptance of the attractive nuisance
doctrine (although application of the doctrine is presently being
limited by the supreme court), but does not extend to any special
treatment of minors under the state's automobile guest statute.
Satisfaction with this state of Nebraska law may largely de-
pend on the side of a lawsuit on which the person contemplating
the law finds himself. To the objective observer, however, there
are strong considerations both for and against the favoritism
extended children in negligence law.
On the one hand, there is a natural eqmpassion for children,
especially very young ones, and where a child is injured or
thoughtlessly injures another this compassion is understand-
ably stronger. It is also common knowledge that children, since
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they are not adults, will not and probably cannot conduct their
activities with the same prudence expected of adults. Even if the
law were to expect of children the same prudence it demands of
adults, it seems unlikely that juries would follow suit.
On the other hand, adults who are suing or being sued by
minors find themselves in a position which, at least to them,
smacks of injustice. At best, the adult parties find their minor
opponents' acts gauged by a subjective standard of care; at
worst, when the children are of tender years, they find that the
minors are held incapable of negligent acts. Even more unjust
would seem the position of a nine-year-old party, whose acts are
judged by the subjective standard, who is suing or being sued by
a seven-year-old party, who is by law incapable of negligence.
Some jurisdictions have sought to alleviate such injustices by
applying an adult's objective standard of care to minors en-
gaged in adult activities. While this adjustment to the law's
favoritism of minors may serve a useful purpose in the most
extreme cases, the courts' lack of candor in formulating their
rationales limits the adult-activities doctrine's usefulness.
More useful could be an approach which places less empha-
sis on the adultness or childishness of a certain activity; an
approach which instead considers the practicalities of compen-
sating the person injured-whether adult or child-if the person
causing the injury has resources or insurance which make
compensation possible. In realistic terms, this approach would
be most significant where the minor is the defendant and is
covered in his activity by a family liability policy. Since it is the
insurer's, not the child's, money which is sought by the injured
adult plaintiff, there is some argument that the insurer ought
not be able to invoke its insured's tenderness of years to prevent
the plaintiff's recovery.
This approach, focusing on compensation, would be of lesser
significance where the child is the plaintiff and his defendant
accuses him of contributory negligence. Here the potential in-
justice to the adult is already prevented to some degree by the
Nebraska Supreme Court's holdings that, even though a child
may be incapable of contributory negligence, if the child's in-
juries resulted from his own acts and not those of the defendant,
there can be no recovery. Even in this type of case, however, a
compensation focus could result in fairer treatment of an adult
defendant. If the child is included in a family health insurance
policy, there is some argument that his insurer ought not be able
to use the child's limited or complete incapacity to be
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contributorily negligent to recover from the defendant on a
subrogated claim.
In both of the above instances, whether the child is a defend-
ant or plaintiff, the risk is thus placed on the primary insurer.
With the primary insurer so liable, not only is the risk of loss
capable of being effectively spread, but the necessity of litiga-
tion is minimized. Thereby, at least in cases in which insurance
is present, the adult defendant or plaintiff is spared the harsher
applications of the law's favoritism for the child charged with
primary or contributory negligence.
T. Edward Icenogle '78
